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ABSTRACT
Automated Lane Centering (ALC) systems are convenient and
widely deployed today, but also highly security and safety critical.
In this work, we are the first to systematically study the security of
state-of-the-art deep learning based ALC systems in their designed
operational domains under physical-world adversarial attacks. We
formulate the problem with a safety-critical attack goal, and a novel
and domain-specific attack vector: dirty road patches. To systemati-
cally generate the attack, we adopt an optimization-based approach
and overcome domain-specific design challenges such as camera
frame inter-dependencies due to dynamic vehicle actuation, and
the lack of objective function design for lane detection models.
We evaluate our attack method on a production ALC system
using 80 attack scenarios from real-world driving traces. The results
show that our attack is highly effective with over 92% success rates
and less than 0.95 sec average success time, which is substantially
lower than the average driver reaction time. Such high attack ef-
fectiveness is also found (1) robust to motion model inaccuracies,
different lane detection model designs, and physical-world factors,
and (2) stealthy from the driver’s view. To concretely understand the
end-to-end safety consequences, we further evaluate on concrete
real-world attack scenarios using a production-grade simulator,
and find that our attack can successfully cause the victim to hit the
highway concrete barrier or a truck in the opposite direction with
98% and 100% success rates. We also discuss defense directions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Automated Lane Centering (ALC) is a Level-2 driving automation
technology that automatically steers a vehicle to keep it centered in
the traffic lane [1]. Due to its high convenience for human drivers,
today it is widely available on various vehicle models such as Tesla,
GM Cadillac, Honda Accord, Toyota RAV4, Volvo XC90, Nissan
Rogue, Hyundai Sonata, etc. While convenient, such system is
highly security and safety critical: When the ALC system starts to
make wrong steering decisions, the human driver may not have
enough reaction time to prevent safety hazards such as driving off
road or colliding into vehicles in adjacent lanes, especially those in
the opposite direction. Even with collision avoidance systems, it
cannot prevent the vehicle from hitting the curb, falling down the
highway cliff, or being hit by other vehicles that fail to yield. Thus,
it is imperative and urgent to understand the security property of
ALC systems.
∗Co-first authors
To achieve its intelligent driving function, the most critical step
in an ALC system is lane detection, which is naturally performed
using cameras since lane lines are visual patterns. So far, Deep
Neural Network (DNN) based lane detection achieves the highest
accuracy [2] and is adopted in the most performant production ALC
systems today such as Tesla Autopilot [3]. Thus, the end-to-end
security of state-of-the-art ALC systems today highly depends on
the security of such DNN-based lane detection models.
Recent works show that DNNs are vulnerable to physical-world
adversarial attacks such as malicious stickers on traffic signs [4–7].
However, none of their methods can be directly applied to attack
ALC systems due to 3 unique design challenges: (C1) There lacks
a physical-world attack vector that can appear to be legitimately
deployed around traffic lane areas. Existing ones such as small stick-
ers are not ideal since directly performing them to traffic lanes is
illegal [8]. (C2) In ALC systems, the physical-world attack genera-
tion needs to handle inter-dependencies among camera frames due
to dynamic vehicle actuation. For example, if the attack deviates the
detected lane to the right in a frame, the ALC system will steer the
vehicle to the right accordingly. This causes the following frames to
capture road areas more to the right, and thus directly affect their
attack generation. To the best of our knowledge, no prior works
consider such strong frame inter-dependencies in attack generation.
(C3) The optimization objective function designs in prior works
are mainly for image classification or object detection models and
thus aim at changing class or bounding box probabilities [4, 7].
However, attacking lane detection requires to change the shape of
the detected lane and thus none of these designs can directly apply.
The only prior effort that studied adversarial attacks on a pro-
duction ALC system is from Tencent [9], which fooled the ALC
system in Tesla Autopilot to follow fake lane lines created by white
stickers on road regions originally without lane lines. However, it
is neither attacking the designed operational domain for ALC sys-
tems, i.e., roads with lane lines, nor generating the perturbations
systematically by addressing any of the 3 design challenges above.
To fill this critical research gap, in this work we are the first to
systematically study the security of DNN-based ALC systems in
their designed operational domains (i.e., roads with lane lines) under
physical-world adversarial attacks. Since ALC systems assume a
fully-attentive human driver prepared to take over at any time [1,
10], we identify the attack goal as not only causing the victim a
lateral deviation (i.e., to the left or right) large enough to drive out
of the current lane boundaries, but also achieving it shorter than
the average driver reaction time to road hazard. This thus directly
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breaks the design goal of ALC systems and can cause various types
of safety hazards such as driving off road and vehicle collisions.
Targeting this attack goal, we design a novel physical-world
adversarial attack method on ALC systems, called DRP (Dirty Road
Patch) attack, which is the first to systematically address all the
3 design challenges above. To address challenge C1, we are the
first to identify dirty road patches as an attack vector in physical-
world adversarial attacks. This design has 2 unique advantages:
(1) Road patches can appear to be legitimately deployed on traffic
lanes in the physical world, e.g., for fixing road cracks; and (2)
Since it is common for real-world roads to have dirt or white stains,
using similar dirty patterns as the input permutations can allow the
malicious road patch to appear more normal and thus stealthier.
With this novel and domain-specific attack vector, we then
design systematic malicious road patch generation following an
optimization-based approach, which has shown both high efficiency
and effectiveness in prior works [4, 11]. In this process, to efficiently
and effectively address challenge C2 without heavyweight road
testing or simulations, we design a novel method that combines ve-
hicle motion model and perspective transformation to dynamically
synthesize camera frame updates according to a lightweight simu-
lated driving trajectory. It only needs one ALC system input trace
on the target road without attack, which can be easily obtained.
Next, to address challenge C3, one direct solution is to design the
objective function to directly change the steering angle decisions.
However, we find that the lateral control step in ALC systems that
calculates steering angle decisions are generally not differentiable,
which makes it difficult to effectively optimize. To address this, we
design a novel lane-bending objective function as a differentiable
surrogate that is equivalent at lateral control design level. We also
have other domain-specific designs in the optimization process, e.g.,
for attack robustness, stealthiness, and physical-world realizability.
We evaluate our attack method on a production ALC system in
OpenPilot [12], which is reported to have state-of-the-art perfor-
mance similar to Tesla Autopilot and GM Super Cruise, and better
than all others [13–15]. We perform experiments on 80 attack sce-
narios from real-world driving traces, and find that our attack is
highly effective with over 92% success rates for all scenarios, and
less than 0.95 sec average success time, which is substantially lower
than 2.5 sec, the average driver reaction time (§3.1). This means that
even for a fully-attentive human driver who can take over as soon
as the attack starts to take effect, her average reaction time is still
far from enough to prevent the damage. We further find that such
high effectiveness is robust to motion model inaccuracies and dif-
ferent lane detection model designs. We also find that the malicious
dirty patterns appear smaller than, or at least similar, to real-world
dirty patterns at 2.5 sec before the attack succeeds. However, if the
human driver is not alerted and takes over at this point, s/he misses
the last chance to prevent the damage (on average).
To understand the attack realizability in the physical world with-
out incurring legal and safety concerns, we further designminiature-
scale experiments, where the road and the malicious road patch are
physically printed out on papers and set up in miniature scale. This
allows us to evaluate our attack against 3 main physical-world fac-
tors: lighting condition, printer color accuracy, and camera sensing
capability. Our results show that the physically-printed malicious
road patch causes the steering angle decision to change substan-
tially from 0.9◦ to the right to 22.3◦ to the left, which demonstrates
a high physical-world realizability of our attack.
To more concretely understand the end-to-end safety conse-
quences of our attack, we further construct concrete real-world
attack scenarios and perform attack evaluation using a production-
grade simulator. The results show that our attack can successfully
cause the victim to hit the highway concrete barrier or a truck in
the opposite direction with 98% and 100% success rates respectively.
The simulated attack consequences in both scenarios look quite dan-
gerous and can be fatal, and also happen very fast within ∼1 second.
Demo videos showing such end-to-end attack impact are available
at: https://sites.google.com/view/cav-sec/alc-adv-attack.
Considering the popularity of ALC systems and the severe safety
implications shown in this paper, the discovered attack requires
community attention and defense discussion. Thus, we also discuss
defense directions for DNN models and via sensor/data fusion.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We are the first to systematically study the security of DNN-
based ALC systems in their designed operational domains un-
der physical-world adversarial attacks. We formulate the prob-
lem with a safety-critical attack goal, and a novel and domain-
specific attack vector, dirty road patches.
• To systematically generate malicious road patches, we adopt an
optimization-based approach with 2 major novel and domain
specific designs: motion model based input generation, and
lane-bending objective function. We also have domain-specific
designs for improving the malicious road patch robustness,
stealthiness, and physical-world realizability.
• We evaluate our attack method on a production ALC system
using 80 attack scenarios from real-world driving traces. The re-
sults show that our attack is highly effective with ≥92% success
rates and ≤0.95 sec average success time, which is substan-
tially lower than the average driver reaction time. Such high
effectiveness is also found (1) robust to motion model inaccura-
cies, different lane detection model designs, and physical-world
factors, and (2) stealthy from the driver’s view.
• To concretely understand the end-to-end safety consequences,
we further evaluate on concrete real-world attack scenarios
using a production-grade simulator. The results show that our
attack can successfully cause the victim to hit the highway
concrete barrier or a truck in the opposite direction with 98%
and 100% success rates. We also discuss defense directions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview of DNN-based ALC Systems
Fig. 1 shows an overview of a typical ALC system design [12, 16, 17],
which operates in 3 steps to achieve automated lane centering:
Lane Detection (LD). Lane detection is the most critical step
in an ALC system, since the driving decisions later are made solely
based on its output. Camera is the most frequently used sensor
for this step [18] since it is not only a natural choice as lane lines
are visual patterns, but also cheap. On the camera frames, a Lane
Detection (LD) model is used to detect lane lines. Recently, DNN-
based LD models achieve the state-of-the-art accuracy [19–21] and
thus are adopted in the most performant production ALC systems
2
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Figure 1: Overview of the typical ALC system design.
today such as Tesla Autopilot [3]. Since lane line shapes do not
change much across consecutive frames, Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) is widely adopted in LD models to achieve more stable pre-
diction [12, 22, 23]. LD models typically first predict the lane line
points, and then post-process them to lane line curves for denoising
and data compression, using curve fitting algorithms [19, 20, 24, 25].
Before the LDmodel is applied, a Region of Interest (ROI) filtering
is usually performed to the raw camera frame to crop the most
important area out of it (i.e., the road surface with lane lines) as the
model input. Such ROI area is typically around the center and much
smaller than the original frame, to improve the model performance
and accuracy [26]. In §4.2, we leverage this in our design to achieve
a lightweight synthesis of the attack-influenced camera frames.
Lateral control. This step calculates steering angle decisions
to keep the vehicle driving at the center of the detected lane line
curves. It first computes a desired driving path, which is typically
at the center of the detected left and right lane lines [27]. Next,
a control loop mechanism, e.g., Proportional-Integral-Derivative
(PID) controller [28] or Model Predictive Control (MPC) [29], is
applied to calculate the optimal steering angle decisions that can
follow the desired driving path as much as possible considering the
current vehicle state and physical constraints.
Vehicle actuation. This step interprets the steering angle deci-
sion into actuation commands, i.e., steering angles or torques. Here,
the actuated steering changes are limited by a maximum value due
to the physical constraints of the mechanical control units and also
for driving stability and safety [27]. For example, in our experi-
ments with a production-level ALC system with 100 Hz control
frequency, such limit is 0.25◦ per control step (every 10 ms) for
vehicle models such as Tesla Model S [30]. As detailed later in §3.3,
such steering limit introduces a unique challenge to our design.
2.2 Physical-World Adversarial Attacks
Recent works find that DNN models are generally vulnerable to
adversarial example, or adversarial attacks [11, 31]. Some works fur-
ther explored such attacks in the physical world [5–7, 32–40], e.g.,
it is found that camera-based object detection models can be fooled
by just adding small stickers to the Stop sign [5–7]. While these
prior works concentrate on DNN models for image classification,
object detection, and end-to-end autonomous driving tasks, we are
the first to systematically study such attacks on production-level
DNN-based ALC systems, which requires to address various new
and unique design challenges as detailed later in §3.3.
3 ATTACK FORMULATION AND CHALLENGE
3.1 Attack Goal and Incentives
In this paper, we consider an attack goal that directly breaks the
design goal of ALC systems: causing the victim vehicle a lateral
deviation (i.e., deviating to the left or right) large enough to drive
out of the current lane boundaries. Meanwhile, since ALC systems
assume a fully-attentive human driver who is prepared to take
Table 1: Required deviations and success time for success-
ful attacks on ALC systems on highway and local roads. De-
tailed calculations and explanations are in Appendix A.
Road Type Required Lateral Deviation Required Success Time
Highway 0.735 meters <2.5 seconds (average driver
reaction time to road hazard)Local road 0.285 meters
over at any moment [1, 10], such deviation needs to be achieved
fast enough so that the human driver cannot react in time to take
over and steer back. Table 1 shows concrete values of these two
requirements for successful attacks on highway and local roads
respectively, which will be used as evaluation metrics later in §5. In
the table, the required deviations are calculated based on represen-
tative vehicle and lane widths in the U.S., and the required success
time is determined using commonly-used average driver reaction
time to road hazards, which is detailed in Appendix A. Specifically,
we find multiple driver reaction time values referenced in differ-
ent government-issued transportation policy guidelines [41–44],
and we choose the smallest one (2.5 sec [41]) to avoid possible
overestimation of the attack effectiveness in our evaluation.
Safety implications. The attack goal above can directly cause
various types of safety hazards in the real world: (1) Driving off
road, which is a direct violation of traffic rules [45] and can cause
various safety hazards such as hitting road curbs or falling down
the highway cliff. Note that these cannot be prevented even when
the vehicle can perform perfect obstacle or collision avoidance. (2)
Vehicle collisions, e.g., with vehicles parked on the road side, or
driving in adjacent or opposite traffic lanes. Even when the vehicle
can perform obstacle or collision avoidance, these collisions are
still possible for two reasons. First, today’s obstacle and collision
avoidance systems are not perfect. For example, a recent study
shows that automatic braking systems in popular vehicle models
today fail to avoid crashes 60% of the time [46]. Second, even if
they can successfully perform emergency stop, they cannot prevent
the victim from being hit by other vehicles that fail to yield on
time, given the 2.5 sec average reaction time for human drivers.
Later in §6, we construct end-to-end real-world attack scenarios to
concretely evaluate and demonstrate these safety consequences.
Attack incentives.Nomatter whether the road accidents above
are actually caused or not in the end, the victim vehicles under the
attack goal are already exhibiting unsafe driving behaviors. These
can thus already damage the reputation of the corresponding vehi-
cle manufacturers or ALC system providers. Thus, a likely attack
incentive can be business competition, which can allow one vehicle
manufacturers or ALC system provider to deliberately damage the
reputation of its rival companies and thus unfairly gain competitive
advantages on the market. Meanwhile, considering the direct safety
impact, we also cannot rule out the possible incentives for terrorist
attacks, e.g., for political or financial purposes.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume that the attacker can obtain the same ALC system as the
one used by the victim to get a full knowledge of its implementation
details. This can be done through purchasing or renting the victim
vehicle model and reverse engineering it, which has already been
demonstrated possible on Tesla Autopilot [9]. Moreover, there exist
production ALC systems that are directly open sourced [12]. We
3
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also assume that the attacker can obtain a motion model [47] of the
victim vehicle, which can be used to simulate its driving trajectory
given the actuation commands, which will be used in our attack
generation process (§4.2). This is a realistic assumption since the
most widely-used motion model, which is also used by us in §4.2,
only needs vehicle parameters such as steering ratio and wheelbase
as input [47], which can be directly found from vehicle model
specifications. We assume the victim drives at the speed limit of
the target road, which is the most common case. In the attack
preparation time, we assume that the attacker can collect the ALC
system inputs (e.g., camera frames) of the target road by directly
driving the victim vehicle model there with the ALC system on.
3.3 Design Challenges
As described in §2, DNN-based LD is themost critical step, and there
are prior works that design successful physical-world adversarial
attacks on DNN models. However, we find none of them can be
directly applied to our problem due to 3 unique design challenges:
C1. Lack of legitimately-deployable attack vector in the
physical world. To affect the camera input of an ALC system, it is
ideal if the malicious perturbations can appear to be legitimately de-
ployed around traffic lane regions in the physical world. To achieve
high legitimacy, such perturbations also must not change the origi-
nal human-perceived lane information. Prior works use small stick-
ers or graffiti in physical-world adversarial attacks [4, 7, 9]. How-
ever, directly performing such activities to traffic lanes in public is
illegal [8]. In our problem setting, the attacker needs to operate in
the middle of the road when deploying the attack on traffic lanes.
Thus, if the attack vector cannot be disguised as legitimate activities,
it becomes highly difficult to deploy the attack in practice.
C2. Need to handle camera frame inter-dependency due
to dynamic vehicle actuation. In real-world ALC systems, a suc-
cessful attack on one single frame can barely cause any meaning-
ful lateral deviations due to the steering actuation limit described
in §2.1. For example, for the vehicle models with 0.25◦ limit in 10 ms
and the camera frame rate is 20 Hz (a common one [12, 48]), each
frame can at most introduce 1.25◦ steering angle changes, which
can cause only 0.3-millimeter lateral deviations at 45 mph.
Thus, to achieve our attack goal in §3.1, the attack must be con-
tinuously effective on a sequence of camera frames to increasingly
reach larger actuated steering angles and thus larger lateral de-
viations per frame. In this process, due to the dynamic vehicle
actuation applied by the ALC system, the attack effectiveness for
later frames are directly dependent on that for earlier frames. For
example, if the attack successfully deviates the detected lane to the
right in a frame, the ALC system will steer the vehicle to the right
accordingly. This causes the following frames to capture road areas
more to the right, and thus directly affect their attack generation.
Also, LD models typically use RNNs to improve prediction stability
(§2.1), which thus further amplifies such inter-dependencies. There
are prior works considering attack robustness across sequential
frames, e.g., using EoT [34, 35], but none of them consider dynamic
vehicle actuation and thus they still generate attacks without con-
sidering inter-dependencies across frames. However, as discussed
above, for us it is necessary to handle them in the attack design.
C3. Lack of differentiable objective function design for LD
models. To systematically generate adversarial inputs, prior works
predominately adopt optimization-based approaches, which have
shown both high efficiency and effectiveness [4, 11, 49, 50]. How-
ever, the objective function designs in these prior works are mainly
for image classification [4, 35] or object detection [5–7] models,
which thus aim at decreasing class or bounding box probabilities.
However, as introduced in §2.1, LDmodels output detected lane line
curves, and thus to achieve our attack goal the objective function
design needs to aim at changing the shape of such curves. This is
substantially different from decreasing probability values, and thus
none of these existing designs can directly apply.
Closer to our problem, prior works that attack end-to-end au-
tonomous driving models [37–40] directly design their objective
function to change the final steering angle decisions. However, as
described in §2.1, state-of-the-art LD models do not directly output
steering angle decisions. Instead, they output lane line curves and
rely on the lateral control step to compute the final steering angle
decisions. However, many steps in the lateral control module, e.g.,
the desired driving patch calculation and the MPC framework, are
generally not differentiable to the LD model input (i.e., camera
frames), which makes it difficult to effectively optimize.
4 DIRTY ROAD PATCH ATTACK DESIGN
In this paper, we are the first to systematically address all the 3
design challenges in §3.3 by designing a novel physical-world attack
method on ALC systems, called Dirty Road Patch (DRP) attack.
4.1 Design Overview
To address the 3 design challenges in §3.3, our DRP attack method
has the following novel design components:
Dirty road patch: Legitimately-deployable and stealthy
physical-world attack vector. To address challenge C1, we are
the first to identify dirty road patch as an attack vector in physical-
world adversarial attacks. This design has 2 unique advantages. First,
road patches can appear to be legitimately deployed on traffic lanes
in the physical world, e.g., for fixing road cracks. Today, deploying
them is made easy with adhesive designs [51] as shown in Fig. 2.
The attacker can thus take time to prepare the attack in house by
carefully printing the malicious input perturbations on top of such
adhesive road patches, and then pretend to be road workers like
those in Fig. 2 to quickly deploy it when the target road is the most
vacant, e.g., in late night, to avoid drawing too much attention.
Second, since it is common for real-world roads to have dirt or
white stains such as those in Fig. 2, using similar dirty patterns
as the input perturbations can allow the malicious road patch to
appear more normal and thus stealthier. To mimic the normal dirty
patterns, our design only allows color perturbations on the gray
scale, i.e., black-and-white. To avoid changing the lane information
as discussed in §3.3, in our design we (1) require the original lane
lines to appear exactly the same way on the malicious patch, if
covered by the patch, and (2) restrict the brightness of the pertur-
bations to be strictly lower than that of the original lane lines. To
further improve stealthiness, we also design parameters to adjust
the perturbation size and pattern, which are more detailed in §4.3.3.
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Figure 2: Illustration of our novel and domain-specific at-
tack vector: dirty road patch.
Motionmodel based input generation. To address the strong
inter-dependencies among the camera frames (challenge C2), we
need to dynamically update the content of later camera frames
according to the actuation decisions applied at earlier ones in the
attack generation process. Since adversarial attack generation typi-
cally takes thousands of optimization iterations [52, 53], it is practi-
cally highly difficult, if not impossible, to drive real vehicles on the
target road to obtain such dynamic frame update every time the
perturbations are updated in an iteration. Another idea is to use ve-
hicle simulators [54, 55], but it requires the attacker to first create a
high-definition 3D scene of the target road in the real world, which
requires a significant amount of hardware resource and engineering
efforts. Also, launching a vehicle simulator in each optimization
iteration can greatly harm the attack generation speed.
To efficiently and effectively address this challenge, we combine
vehicle motion model [47] and perspective transformation [56, 57]
to dynamically synthesize camera frame updates according to a
driving trajectory simulated in a lightweight way. This method is
inspired by Google Street View [58] that synthesizes 360◦ views
from a limited number of photos utilizing perspective transforma-
tion. Our method only requires one trace of the ALC system inputs
(e.g., camera frames) from the target road without attack, which
can be easily obtained by the attacker (§3.2).
Optimization-based dirty patch generation. To systemati-
cally generate effectivemalicious patches, we adopt an optimization-
based approach similar to prior works [4, 11]. To address challenge
C3, we design a novel lane-bending objective function as a dif-
ferentiable surrogate that aims at changing the derivatives of the
desired driving path before the lateral control module, which is
equivalent to change the steering angle decisions at the lateral con-
trol design level. Besides this, we also have other domain-specific
designs in the optimization problem formulation, e.g., for a differ-
entiable construction of the curve fitting process, malicious road
patch robustness, stealthiness, and physical-world realizability.
Fig. 3 shows an overview of the malicious road patch generation
process, which is detailed in the following sections.
4.2 Motion Model based Input Generation
In Fig. 3, step 1○– 7○ belong to the motion model based input gen-
eration component. As described earlier in §4.1, the input to this
component is a trace of ALC system inputs such as camera frames
from driving on the target road without attack. In 1○, we apply per-
spective transformation, a widely-used computer vision technique
that can project an image view from a 3D coordinate system to a
2D plane [56, 57]. Specifically, we apply it to the original camera
⑦ Feed to
ALC
Motion Model
Camera 
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Figure 3: Overview of our DRP (Dirty Road Patch) attack
method. ROI: Region of Interest; BEV: Bird’s Eye View.
frames from the driver’s view to obtain their Bird’s Eye View (BEV)
images. This transformation is highly beneficial since it makes our
later patch placement and attack-influenced camera frame updates
much more natural and thus convenient. We denote this process as
Vt := BEV(It ), where It and Vt are the original camera input and
its BEV view respectively at frame t . This process is inversible, i.e.,
we can also obtain It with BEV−1(Vt ).
Next, in 2○, we obtain the generated malicious road patch image
P from the optimization-based dirty patch generation component
(§4.3) and place it on Vt to obtain the BEV image with the patch,
denoted as V̂t := Λ(Vt , P). To achieve consistent road patch place-
ments in the world coordinate across frames, we calculate the pixel-
meter relationship, , i.e., the number of pixels per meter, in the BEV
images based on the driving trace of the target road. With this, we
can place the patch in each frame precisely based on the driving
trajectory changes across frames.
Next, we compute the vehicle moving trajectory changes caused
by the placed malicious road patch, and reflect such changes in the
camera frames. We represent the vehicle moving trajectory as a
sequence of vehicle states St := [xt ,yt , βt ,vt ], (t = 1, ...,T ), where
xt ,yt , βt ,vt are the vehicle’s 2D position, heading angle, and speed
at frame t , and T is the total number of frames in the driving trace.
Thus, the trajectory change at frame t is δt := Sat − Sot , where Sat
and Sot are vehicle states with and without attack respectively.
To calculate δt caused by the attack effect at the frame t − 1, we
need to know the attack-influenced vehicle state Sat . To achieve
that, we use a vehicle motion model to simulate the vehicle state Sat
by feeding the steering angle decision τt−1 from the lateral control
step in the ALC system (§2.1) given the attacked frame at t − 1 and
the previous vehicle state Sat−1, denoted as S
a
t := MM(Sat−1,τt−1).
A vehicle motion model is a set of parameterized mathematical
equations representing the vehicle dynamics and can be used to
simulate its driving trajectory given the speed and actuation com-
mands. In this process, we set the vehicle speed as the speed limit
of the target road as described in our threat model (§3.2). In our
design, we adopt the kinematic bicycle model [59], which is the
most widely-used motion model for vehicles [59–61].
With δt , in 4○ we then apply affine transformations on the BEV
image V̂t to obtain the attack-influenced one V̂ at , denoted as V̂ at :=
T (V̂t ,δt ). Fig. 4 shows an example of the shifting and rotation T (·)
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Figure 4: Motion model based input
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in the BEV, which synthesizes a camera frame with the vehicle
position shifted by 1 meter and rotated by 10◦ to the right. Although
it causes some distortion andmissing areas on the edge, the ROI area
(red rectangle), i.e., the LD model input, is still complete and thus
sufficient for our purpose. Since the ROI area is typically focused
on the center and much smaller than the raw camera frame (§2.1),
our method can successfully synthesize multiple complete attack-
influenced LD model inputs from only 1 ALC system input trace.
Next, in 5○, we obtain the attack-influenced camera frame at
the driver’s view Îat , i.e., the direct input to the ALC system, by
projecting V̂ at back using Îat := BEV−1(V̂ at ). Next, in 6○, the ROI
filtering from the ALC system is used to extract the model input
Xat := ROI(̂Iat ). Xat and vehicle state Sat are then fed to the ALC
system in 7○ to obtain the steering angle decision τt , denoted as
τt := ALC(Xat , Sat ). Step 3○– 7○ are then iteratively applied to obtain
Îat+1, Î
a
t+2, ... one after one until all the original frames are updated
to reflect the moving trajectory changes caused by P . These updated
attack-influenced inputs are then fed to the optimization-based dirty
patch generation component, which is detailed next.
4.3 Optimization-based Dirty Patch Generation
In Fig. 3, step 8○ belongs to the optimization-based road path gener-
ation component. In this step, we design a domain-specific optimiza-
tion process on the target ALC system to systematically generate
the malicious dirty road patch P .
DRP attack optimization problem formulation.We formu-
late the attack generation as the following optimization problem:
min L (1)
s.t. X at = ROI(BEV−1(T (Λ(Vt , P ), Sat − Sot ))) (t = 1, ..., T ) (2)
τ at = ALC(X at , Sat ) (t = 1, ..., T ) (3)
Sat+1 = MM(Sat , τ at ) + ϵt (t = 1, ..., T − 1) (4)
Sa1 = S
o
1 (5)
P = BLUR(FILL(B) + ∆) (6)
∆ ∈P (7)
where theL in Eq. 1 is an objective function that aims at deviating
the victim out of the current lane boundaries as soon as possible
by minimizing it, which is detailed in §4.3.2. Eq. 2–5 have been
described in §4.2. In Eq. 6, the patch image P ∈ RH×W ×C consists
of a base color B ∈ RC and the perturbation ∆ ∈ RH×W ×C , where
W ,H , and C are the patch image width, height, and the number
of color channels respectively. We select an asphalt-like color as
the base color B since the image is designed to mimic a road patch.
Function FILL: RC → RH×W ×C fills B to the entire patch image.
Since we aim at generating perturbations that mimic the normal
dirty patterns on roads, we restrict ∆ to be within a stealthy road
pattern spaceP , which is detailed in §4.3.3. We also include a noise
term ϵt in Eq. 4 and a image blurring function BLUR(·) in Eq. 6 to
improve the patch robustness to vehicle motion model inaccuracies
and camera image blurring, which are detailed in §4.3.4 and §4.3.5.
4.3.1 Optimization Process Overview. Fig. 5 shows an overview
of our iterative optimization process design to solve the optimiza-
tion problem above. Given an initial patch image P , we obtain the
model input Xa1 , ...,X
a
T from the motion model based input genera-
tion process. In step (i), we calculate the gradients of the objective
function with respect to Xa1 , ...,X
a
T , and only keep the gradients
corresponding to the patch areas. In step (ii), these gradients are
projected into the BEV space. In step (iii), we calculate the average
BEV-space gradients weighted by their corresponding patch area
sizes in the model inputs. This weighted averaging is designed to
prevent the averaged gradient from being dominated by the earlier
frames, where the patch is far and small but the whole patch is visi-
ble. Next, in step (iv), we update the current patch with Adam [62]
using the averaged gradient as the gradient of the patch image. In
step (v), we then project the updated patch into the stealthy road
pattern spaceP . This updated patch image is then fed back to the
motion model based input generation module, where we also add
robustness improvement such as motion noises and image blurring.
We terminate this optimization process when the attack-introduced
lateral deviations obtained from the motion model are large enough.
4.3.2 Lane-Bending Objective Function Design. As discussed in §4.1,
directly using steering angle decisions asL makes the objective
function non-differentiable toXa1 , ...,X
a
T . To address this, we design
a novel lane-bending objective function f (·) as a differentiable
surrogate function. In this design, our key insight is that at the
design level, the lateral control step aims at making steering angle
decisions that follows a desired driving path in the middle of the
detected left and right lane line curves from the lane detection step
(§2.1). Thus, changing the steering angle decisions is equivalent
to changing the derivatives of (or “bending”) such desired driving
path curve. This allows us to design f (·) as follows:
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f (X a1 , ..., X aT ) =
T∑
t=1
∑
d∈Dt
∇ρt (d ; {X aj |j ≤ t }, θ ) + λ | |Ωt (X at ) | |p (8)
where ρt (d) is a parametric curve whose parameters are decided
by (1) both the current and previous model inputs {Xaj |j ≤ t} due
to frame inter-dependencies (§3.3), and (2) the LD model DNN
parameters θ . Dt is a set of curve point index d = 0, 1, 2, ... for the
desired driving path curve at frame t . λ is the weight of the p-norm
regularization term, which is designed for stealthiness and detailed
later in §4.3.3. We then can define L in Eq. 1 as f (·) and −f (·)
when attacking to the left and right respectively. Fig. 6 illustrates
this surrogate function design when attacking to the left. As shown,
by maximizing ∇ρt (d) at each curve point in Eq. 8, we can achieve
a “lane bending” effect to the desired driving path curve. Since the
direct LD model output is lane line points (§2.1) but ρt (·) require
lane line curves, we further perform a differentiable construction of
the curve fitting process, which is detailed in Appendix B.
4.3.3 Designs for Dirty Patch Stealthiness. As described in §4.1,
we design the perturbations on the malicious road patch to mimic
real-world dirty patterns such as those in Fig. 2 so that they can
appear more normal and thus stealthier. Specifically, 4 stealthiness
designs are considered in the stealthy road pattern spaceP in the
optimization process (Eq. 7) as follows:
Grayscale perturbation. Real-world dirty patterns on the road
are usually created by dust or white stains (Fig. 2), and thus most
commonly just appear white. Thus, we cannot directly follow pre-
vious works in the image space [7] to allow perturbations with
arbitrary colors. Thus, our design restricts our perturbation ∆ in
the grayscale (i.e., black-and-white). To achieve this, we perturb ∆
in the YCbCr color space [63] instead of the RGB space, by only
allowing to increase its Y channel (the grayscale channel) value,
denoted as ∆Y ≥ 0, with its Cb and Cr channel values always zero.
Preserving original lane line information.We preserve the
original lane line information by drawing the same lane lines as
the original ones on the patch (if covered by the patch). Note that
without this our attack can be easier to succeed, but as discussed
in §3.3, it is much more preferred to preserve such information
so that the attack deployment process can more easily appear as
legitimate road work activities and the deployed patch is less likely
to be legitimately removed due to the lack of the correct lane lines.
Brightness limits. While the dirty patterns are restricted to
grayscale, they are still the darker, the stealthier. Also, to best pre-
serve the original lane information, the brightness of the dirty
patterns should not be more than that of the original lane lines.
Thus, we (1) add the p-norm regularization term in the objective
function (Eq. 8) to suppress the amount of ∆Y , and (2) restrict
BY +∆Y < LaneLineY , where BY and LaneLineY are the Y channel
values for the base color and original lane line color respectively.
Perturbation area restriction. Besides brightness, also the
fewer patch areas are perturbed, the stealthier. Thus, we define
Perturbable Area Ratio (PAR) as the percentage of pixels on P that
can be perturbed in the optimization process. Thus, when PAR=30%,
70% pixels on P will only have the base color B.
4.3.4 Dirty Patch Robustness Improvement. In our attack genera-
tion process, we use the vehicle moving trajectory simulated by a
motion model to judge the attack effectiveness (§4.3.1). However, all
motion models have inaccuracies due to the difficulty in precisely
modeling all the complex and dynamic interactions among the road,
tires, and the vehicle internal components in the real world. Thus,
when the generated road patch is deployed in practice, the actual
moving behaviors of the victim will be different from the simulated
ones by our motion model in the attack generation time. Thus, to
improve the attack robustness, we add noises ϵt to the vehicle state
Sat during the motion model based input generation process. More
specifically, we apply ϵt following a normal distribution N(0,α) to
both of the MM(·) outputs that are used in our input generation:
the lateral position yt , and the heading angle βt .
4.3.5 Designs for Physical-World Realizability. After the malicious
road patch is generated digitally, the color and pattern of its per-
turbations can be perceived differently by camera devices in the
physical world due to 3 main practical factors: (1) the lighting con-
dition, (2) printer color accuracy, and (3) camera sensing capability,
e.g., color accuracy and image clarity. Such differences can thus de-
grade the attack effectiveness when applying our attack in practice.
To address this, we create a color mapping between the intended
colors and the camera-perceived colors after the intended ones are
physically printed and captured by the camera device of the targeted
ALC system. In our attack context, the attacker can do the same
on the target road. Since our malicious road patches are designed
to be only in grayscale for stealthiness (§4.3.3), we constrain the
color mapping in the gray scale instead of full color. Then after
the patch is generated digitally, we perform a post-processing step
that uses the color mapping to transform the color of each pixel
to the color that can be mapped to the intended one after being
printed. In addition, we apply the Gaussian blur to both the patch
and gradients during the optimization process to address potential
image blurring introduced by the camera.
5 ATTACK METHODOLOGY EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness, robustness, generality,
and realizability of our DRP attack methodology.
Targeted ALC system. In our evaluation, we perform exper-
iments on the production ALC system in OpenPilot [12], which
follows the state-of-the-art DNN-based ALC system design (§2.1).
OpenPilot is an open-source production Level-2 driving automation
system that can be easily installed in over 80 popular vehicle models
(e.g., Toyota, Chrysler, Cadillac, etc.) by mounting a dashcam. We
select OpenPilot due to its (1) representativeness, since it is reported
to have state-of-the-art performance similar to Tesla Autopilot and
GM Super Cruise and better than all other manufacturers [13–15],
(2) practicality, from the large quantity and diversity of vehicle
models it can support [12], and (3) ease to experiment with, since
it is the only production ALC system that is open sourced. In this
paper, we mainly evaluate on the lane detection model in OpenPilot
v0.7.0, which is released in Dec. 2019. In our methodology general-
ity evaluation in §5.3, we also experiment on LD models from older
OpenPilot versions that have different DNN designs.
Evaluation dataset. In this section, we perform experiments
using the comma2k19 dataset [64], which contains over 33 hours
driving traces between California’s San Jose and San Francisco in
a Toyota RAV4 2017 driven by human drivers. These traces are
7
, , Takami Sato, Junjie Shen, Ningfei Wang, Yunhan Jack Jia, Xue Lin, and Qi Alfred Chen
collected using the official OpenPilot dashcam device, called EON,
which is thus directly compatible with OpenPilot. These traces
include not only the road-facing camera frames, but also the vehicle
steering angle, speed, position, and heading angle associated with
each frame, which are used as inputs to our motion model based
input generation module (§4.2).
From this dataset, we manually look for short driving periods
with a clear driving path ahead, e.g., no front vehicles, to make road
patch placement convenient. In total, we obtain 40 eligible short
driving clips, 10 seconds each, with half of them on the highway,
and half on local roads. For each driving clip, we consider two
attack scenarios: attack to the left, and to the right. Thus, in total
we evaluate 80 different attack scenarios.
5.1 Attack Effectiveness
Evaluation methodology and metrics. We evaluate the attack
methodology effectiveness using the evaluation dataset described
above. For each attack scenario, we use our DRP attack method
to generate a road patch, and use the motion model based input
generation method in §4.2 to simulate the vehicle driving trajectory
influenced by the malicious road patch. To judge the attack success,
we use the attack goal defined in §3.1 and concrete metrics listed
in Table 1, i.e., achieving over 0.735 meters and 0.285 meters lateral
deviations on highway and local-road scenarios respectively within
2.5 seconds, the average driver reaction time to road hazards. We
measure the achieved deviation by calculating the lateral distances
at each time point between the vehicle trajectories with and without
the malicious road patch, and use the earliest time point to reach
the required deviation to calculate the success time.
Since ALC systems assume a human driver who is prepared
to take over, it is better if the malicious road patch can also look
stealthy enough at 2.5 seconds (driver reaction time) before the
attack succeeds so that the driver won’t be alerted by its looking
and decide to take over. Thus, in this section, we also study the
stealthiness of the generated road patches. More specifically, we
quantify their perturbation degrees using the average pixel value
changes to the road patch base color in L1,L2 and Linf distances,
the three common perturbation metrics used in adversarial machine
learning research [65, 66]. Since the perturbation is constrained to
positive (§4.3.3), in our contextL1 andL2 mean howmuch brighter
on average the perturbations are than the base color measured by
absolute and Euclidean distances of pixel values respectively; and
Linf means the largest brightness change to the base color among
all pixels. In our evaluation, the pixel distances are measured in the
RGB space and normalized to [0, 1].
Experimental setup. For each scenario in the evaluation dataset,
we manually mark the road patch placement area in the BEV view
of each camera frame based on the lane width and shape. To achieve
consistent road patch placements in the world coordinate across a
sequence of frames, we calculate the number of pixels per meter in
the BEV images and adjust the patch position in each frame pre-
cisely based on the driving trajectory changes across consecutive
frames. The road patch sizes we use are 3.6–5.4 meters wide to
accommodate the wider lanes on the highway, and 24–36 meters
long to ensure at least a few seconds of visible time at high speed.
The patches are placed 7 meters far from the victim at the starting
frame. For stealthiness levels, we evaluate the L2 regularisation co-
efficient λ = 10−2, 10−3, and 10−4, with PAR set to 50%. According
to Eq. 8, larger λ value means more suppression of the perturbation,
and thus should lead to a higher stealthiness level. We mainly vary
λ in this section since we found that the control of the perturbation
degrees is dominated by λ when PAR is in a wide range around
50%. For the motion model, we directly use the vehicle parameters
of Toyota RAV4 2017, the vehicle model that collects the driving
traces in our dataset, to ensure the consistency. Specifically, the
wheelbase is set to 2.65 meters, and lf = lr = 1.325 meters.
Results. Table 2 shows the evaluation results. As shown, our
attack is highly effective under all the 3 stealthiness levels: the
success rates are 100% for all scenarios when λ = 10−4 and 10−3, and
are only slightly lower, but still over 92%, for the highway scenarios
when λ = 10−2, the highest stealthiness level in our experiment.
Such slight success rate decrease is due to the more constrained
attack capability in adding perturbations when the stealthiness level
increases. As will be discussed later, these stealthiness levels well
correlate with the driver-perceived perturbation degrees, and when
λ = 10−2, the malicious dirty patterns on the road patch are almost
invisible in the driver’s view at 2.5 sec (the average driver reaction
time) before the attack succeeds. Among the successful cases, the
average success time is all under 0.95 sec, which is substantially
lower than 2.5 sec, the required success time. This means that even
for a fully attentive human driver who is always able to take over
as soon as the attack starts to take effect, her average reaction time
is still far from enough to prevent the damage.
Stealthiness.As shown in Table 2, theL1 andL2 pixel distances
decrease proportionally in substantial amount when λ increases,
which means the average brightness of the perturbations is well-
controlled by the L2 regularization coefficient λ. In particular, the
L1 andL2 distances are at most 0.074 and 0.114 respectively, which
means that the perturbations are on average only 11.4% brighter
than the base color even at the lowest stealthiness level in our
experiment. Linf is always 0.201 for highway scenarios and 0.210
for local road scenarios, which means that the perturbations are at
most 21% brighter than the base color.
To visually understand these stealthiness levels, Fig. 7 (a) shows
the malicious road patch appearances at different stealthiness lev-
els from the driver’s view at 2.5 seconds before our attack suc-
ceeds. As shown, in local road scenarios, some white dirty patterns
can be seen on the road patches with the lowest stealthiness level
(λ = 10−4), while the perturbations on the ones with the highest
stealthiness level (λ = 10−2) are almost invisible. As shown, even
for the lowest stealthiness level (λ = 10−4) in our experiment, the
perturbations are still smaller than some real-world dirty patterns
such as the left one in Fig. 7 (b). In addition, we find that the per-
turbations for all these 3 stealthiness levels are already much less
intrusive than those in previous physical-world adversarial machine
learning attacks in the image space, for example the state-of-the-art
ones for traffic sign recognition [7] shown in Fig. 7 (c). In highway
scenarios, since the speed is higher, the malicious road patches ap-
pear much farther away at 2.5 seconds before our attack succeeds
compared to local road scenarios, which thus allows our attack to
appear even stealthier as shown in the rightmost figure in Fig. 7 (a).
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Table 2: Attack success rate and time under different stealth-
iness levels. Larger λmeans stealthier. Average success time
is calculated only among the successful cases. Pixel L1, L2,
and Linf are the average pixel value changes to the road
patch base color in the RGB space and normalized to [0, 1].
Stealthiness
Level
Scenario
Type
Succ.
Rate
Ave. Succ.
Time (sec)
Pixel
L1
Pixel
L2
Pixel
Linf
λ = 10−2 Highway 92.5% 0.901 0.014 0.038 0.201Local 100% 0.945 0.015 0.043 0.210
λ = 10−3 Highway 100% 0.865 0.036 0.069 0.201Local 100% 0.926 0.037 0.073 0.210
λ = 10−4 Highway 100% 0.854 0.069 0.107 0.201Local 100% 0.919 0.074 0.114 0.210
From Fig. 7 and Table 2, we find that the stealthiness level with
λ = 10−3 strikes an ideal balance between attack effectiveness and
stealthiness: it not only has similar or smaller white dirty patterns
compared to real-world ones such as those shown in Fig. 7 (b) at
2.5 seconds before our attack succeeds, but also has no sacrifice
of attack effectiveness as shown in Table 2. Thus, we use it as the
default stealthiness configuration in our following experiments.
5.2 Robustness to Motion Model Inaccuracies
In this section, we evaluate the attack robustness to different levels
of such inaccuracies. We first obtain the errors of the motion model
used in our attack as 0.008 m mean with 0.002 m standard deviation
based on previous measurement studies of motion models [59].
Next, we evaluate the attack with such errors randomly sampled
from the uniform distribution U (−∆,∆) with different ∆ levels and
added to both longitudinal and lateral directions independently at
each control step. Our results shows that our attack maintains a
high effectiveness with ≥97.5% success rates even when ∆ is 0.048 m
(i.e., 8× standard deviations, holds for a probability of 1 − 10−13 in
practice). More details are in Appendix C due to page limit.
5.3 Attack Generality Evaluation
To achieve end-to-end attack impact on ALC systems, our attack
method is designed around exploiting the LD model, the most criti-
cal element in ALC systems (§2). Thus, in this section we evaluate
the generality of our attack against LD models of different designs.
Ideally we hope to evaluate on LD models from other production
ALC systems besides OpenPilot, e.g., from Tesla Autopilot. How-
ever, to best of our knowledge, OpenPilot is the only one that is
currently open sourced. Fortunately, we find that the LD models
in some older versions of OpenPilot actually have different DNN
designs (detailed below), which thus can also serve for our purpose.
Experimental setup. We select LD models from OpenPilot
v0.7.0 (used in previous sections), v0.6.6, and v0.5.9 to perform this
evaluation considering their large DNN architecture differences
with each other, which are summarized in Table 3. Specifially, their
numbers of trainable parameters and layers are quite different, e.g.,
the v0.5.9 model has 58-63% fewer weights and 58-60% fewer layers
than the other two. At the DNN design level, they mainly differ by
the use of naive RNN layers or a more advanced one called Gated
Recurrent Unit (GRU), and whether to use Batch Normalization
(BN) layers. More details are in Appendix D. The evaluation dataset
and metrics are the same as §5.1. The experiments use λ = 10−3
and PAR=50%, the default stealthiness level as discussed in §5.1.
Table 3: Evaluation results for attack generality against LD
(Lane Detection) models of different DNN designs in Open-
Pilot. Evaluation metrics are the same as those in Table 2.
LD
Model
DNN
Arch.
Scenario
Type
Succ.
Rate
Succ.
Time (s)
Pixel
L1
Pixel
L2
Pixel
Linf
v0.7.0 CNN+GRU
Highway 100% 0.865 0.036 0.069 0.201
Local 100% 0.926 0.037 0.073 0.210
v0.6.6 CNN+BN+GRU
Highway 90% 0.931 0.032 0.064 0.201
Local 95% 0.955 0.032 0.067 0.210
v0.5.9 CNN+naive RNN
Highway 100% 0.891 0.039 0.076 0.201
Local 100% 0.948 0.039 0.078 0.210
Results. Table 3 shows the results. As shown, our attack is able
to achieve at least 90% and 95% success rates for the highway and
local road scenarios respectively against all three LD models of
different DNN designs, which shows a high generality of the attack
methodology. Among them, the v0.6.6 model seems to have the
highest robustness against our attack, with 5-10% lower success
rates and also higher success time than those for the other models.
Also, the L1 and L2 pixel distances for it are the smallest. Since its
major design-level difference to the v0.7.0 model is BN layers, we
suspect that such robustness increase might come from the use of
BN layers. Interestingly, this is contradicting to latest researches
that find BN layers can harm DNN model robustness [67]. We plan
to systematically investigate this in the future. Between the v0.7.0
and v0.5.9 models, the attack effectiveness is very close. Thus, even
though GRU is supposed to be more advanced and make the driving
more stable, it does not show increased robustness to our attack.
5.4 Physical-World Realizability Evaluation
While we have shown high attack effectiveness, robustness, and
generality on real-world driving traces in the sections above, the
experiments are performed by synthesizing the patch placement
and appearances digitally, which is thus still different from actually
performing the attack in the physical world. As discussed in §4.3.5,
there are 3 main practical factors that can affect the attack effective-
ness in physical world: (1) the lighting condition, (2) printer color
accuracy, and (3) camera sensing capability. Thus, in this section
we perform experiments to understand the physical-world attack
realizability against these 3 main practical factors.
Evaluationmethodology:miniature-scale experiments.To
perform the DRP attack, a real-world attacker can pretend to be
road workers and place the malicious road patch on public roads.
However, it is both unethical and illegal [8] for us as researchers
to do so. It is also unsafe for us since ALC systems typically only
operate when the speed is sufficiently high, e.g., 28 mph [12, 68].
Nevertheless, we still try our best to perform such evaluation by
designing a miniature-scale experiment, where the road and the
malicious road patch are first physically printed out on papers and
placed according to the physical-world attack settings but in minia-
ture scale. Then the real ALC system camera device are used to get
camera inputs from such a miniature-scale physical-world setting.
Such miniature-scale evaluation methodology can capture all the
3 main practical factors in the physical-world attack setting, and
thus can sufficiently serve for the purpose of this evaluation.
Experimental setup.As shown in Fig. 10, we create aminiature-
scale road by printing a real-world high-resolution BEV road texture
on multiple ledger-size papers and concatenating them together to
form a long straight road. In the attack evaluation time, we create
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Local Road Highway
λ=10-4 λ=10-3 λ=10-2 λ=10-3
Figure 7: Driver’s view at 2.5 seconds (average driver reaction time to road hazards [41]) before our attack succeeds under
different stealthiness levels. Inset figures are the zoomed-in views of the malicious road patches. Larger images are in Fig. 15.
Figure 8: Real-world dirty road
patterns similar to our attack.
Figure 9: Stop sign hiding
and appearing attacks [7].
the miniature-scale malicious road patch using the same method,
and place it on top of the miniature-scale road following our DRP
attack design. We mount EON, the official OpenPilot dashcam de-
vice, on a tripod and face it to the miniature-scale road. The road
size, road patch size, and the EON mounting position are carefully
calculated to represent OpenPilot installed on a Toyota RAV4 driv-
ing on a standard 3.6-meter wide highway road at 1:12 scale. We
also use two studio lights to imitate the daytime lighting condition.
As shown, the road texture image we select is a lane image with
solid lane line on the left and a dotted lane line on the right, which
is the most common lane marking setup for the leftmost lane in one
driving direction. Thus, we set the attack goal in our experiments
as to deviate the victim out of the lane on the left to hit the road
barrier or crash into vehicles driving in the opposite direction (both
have end-to-end attack consequence demonstrations later in §6).
Evaluation metric. Since the camera is mounted in a static
position, we evaluate the attack effectiveness directly using the
steering angle decision at the frame level instead of the end-to-
end lateral deviation used in previous sections. This is equivalent
from the attack effectiveness point of view since the large end-to-
end lateral deviation is essentially created by a sequence of large
steering angle decisions at the frame level. Specifically, we first find
the camera frame that has the same relative position between the
camera and the patch as that in the miniature-scale experimental
setup. Then we compare its designed steering angle at the attack
generation time and its observed steering angle that the ALC system
in OpenPilot intends to apply to the vehicle in the miniature-scale
experiment. Thus, the more similar these two steering angles are,
the higher realizability our attack has in the physical world.
Road patch generation.We follow the methodology in §4.3.5
to obtain and apply the color mapping in our experimental setup.
The patch size is set to represent a 4.8-meter wide and 12-meter long
one in the real world scale. Since the EON is static in our settings,
we use the driving trajectory generated by a production-level AV
simulator for the same scenario (the highway scenario in Table 4,
detailed later in §6) in our motion model based input generation.
The other parameters are set the same as those in §5.2.
Attack results. Fig. 11 shows a visualization of the lane detec-
tion results of the benign and attacked scenarios in the miniature-
scale experiment using the OpenPilot’s official visualization tool.
It visualizes the detected lane lines and the desired driving path
that the ALC system will follow based on the lane detection results.
As shown, in the benign scenario, both detected lane lines align
accurately with the actual lane lines on the miniature-scale road,
and the desired driving path is straight as expected. However, when
the malicious road patch is placed, it bends the detected lane lines
significantly to the left and causes the desired driving path to be
curving to the left, which is exactly the designed attack effect of our
lane-bending objective function (§4.3.2). In this case, the designed
steering angle is 23.4 degrees to the left in the attack generation
time, and the observed one in the miniature-scale experiment is
22.3 degrees to the left, which only differs by 4.7%. In contrast, in
the benign scenario the observed steering angle for the same frame
is 0.9 degrees to the right. This thus concretely demonstrates that
our attack is robust to the 3 main practical factors when performed
in the physical world, which thus has high realizability in practice.
6 END-TO-END ATTACK EVALUATION
To concretely understand the end-to-end security/safety implica-
tions of our attack, in this section we construct and evaluate on
real-world attack scenarios using a production-grade simulator.
Evaluation methodology. For safety and ethical considera-
tions, we perform evaluation in a production-grade Autonomous
Driving (AD) simulator called LGSVL [54]. LGSVL is an open-
source Unity-based simulator designed specifically for evaluating
production-level AD systems. It leverages Unity’s built-in physics
engine to accurately simulate the vehicle dynamics and tire-road
interaction, and provide photo-realistic simulation of the driving
environment. It has already been demonstrated [69] to be able to
support production-grade AD systems such as Baidu Apollo [48]
and Autoware [70]. The original LGSVL simulator does not support
OpenPilot, and thus we implemented the bridging between them
(i.e., passing actuation commands and sensor data to each other) on
our own. In this process we overcame engineering challenges such
as the sensing/actuation channel interfacing and control interrup-
tion mechanism modifications, which are detailed in Appendix E.
This is an engineering contribution of this paper and we will open
source it to benefit the community.
End-to-end attack scenario design. We construct 2 end-to-
end attack scenarios for highway and local road settings respec-
tively, which are shown in Fig. 12. As shown, for the highway one,
we place a concrete barrier on the left to the victim’s lane, and
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are printed on ledger-size papers.
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Figure 11: Lane detection and steering angle
decisions in benign and attacked scenarios
in the miniature-scale experiment.
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Figure 12: End-to-end attack scenarios and
driver’s view 2.5 sec before attack succeeds
in simulation. Larger images are in Fig. 16.
Table 4: Simulation scenario configurations and evaluation
results. Lane widths and vehicle speeds are based on stan-
dard/common ones in the U.S. [71]. Simulation results with-
out attack are confirmed to have 0% success rates with
≤0.018 m (std: ≤9e-4) average maximum deviations.
Sim.
Scenario
Lane
Width
Veh.
Speed Attack Goal
Ave. Max
Dev.
Succ.
Rate
Succ.
Time
Highway 3.6 m 65 mph(29 m/s)
Hit the concrete
barrier on the left
0.67 m
(std: 1e-2)
98%
(98/100) 0.7 s
Local 2.7 m 45 mph(20 m/s)
Hit the truck in the
opposite direction
0.90 m
(std: 3e-2)
100%
(100/100) 1.15 s
for the local road one, we place an NPC (Non-Player Character)
truck driving on an opposite direction lane adjacent to the vic-
tim’s. The attack goals for them are to hit the concrete barrier and
the truck respectively, which thus both directly have severe safety
consequences. For each scenario, we design the detailed scenario
configurations such as lane markings, vehicle speed, and lane width
according to the common settings of the given driving scenario in
the real world. Detailed scenario configurations are listed in Table 4.
Experimental setup and evaluation metrics. We perform
evaluation on the LGSVL-OpenPilot bridge we developed for Open-
Pilot v0.6.6. Due to the high engineering efforts in developing the
bridge, we did not evaluate on v0.7.0. However, as shown in §5.3,
the v0.6.6 LD model is actually more robust than the v0.7.0 one and
thus our evaluation results should be applicable to v0.7.0. In the
simulation, we use the Toyota RAV4 parameters in OpenPilot.
Since LGSVL provides photo-realistic simulation of the lighting
condition, it also has a color distortion effect similar to the physical
world. Thus, we follow the methodology in §4.3.5 to obtain and
apply the color mapping in our simulation environment. The patch
size is designed to be 5.4 m wide and 96 m long in the simulation
scale. The other parameter settings are the same as §5.3. The road
patches are placed at least 100 m away from the victim’s starting
position so that the simulation starts from a benign state where the
patch is completely unnoticeable in the camera. For each scenario,
we repeat the simulation for 100 times, and a successful attack is
defined as achieving the corresponding attack goals in Table 12. we
use the simulation logs to determine whether the victim vehicle
body has an intersection with the barrier or the truck body.
Results and attack demos. As shown in Table 4, our attack
achieves 98% and 100% for the highway and local road scenarios re-
spectively, which shows a high end-to-end attack effectiveness. For
the highway scenario, our attack fails 2 of the 100 runs. In these 2,
the deviations are still quite large and both are ≤0.1m away fromhit-
ting the concrete barrier. Such slight vehicle trajectory differences
across multiple runs are likely caused by simulation randomness,
e.g., from the physics engine and messaging delay/dropping.
We record demo videos for both attack scenarios from the simula-
tion experiments, available athttps://sites.google.com/view/cav-
sec/alc-adv-attack. In the highway scenario, after the victim hits
the concrete barrier, it bounces away quickly due to the abrupt
collision. In the local road one, the victim crashes to the front of
the truck, causing a full stop for both the victim and truck. Such
simulation results look highly dangerous and can be fatal, which
thus concretely demonstrate the severe end-to-end safety conse-
quences of our attack. Snapshots of the demo when the attack goals
are achieved are in Fig. 14 in the Appendix.
In the simulation, the attack happens very fast: in ∼1 sec, the
victim is already deviated out of the lane boundary. Similar to our
conclusion in §5.1, this means that even if the driver notices the
attack when the vehicle starts to deviate, it is already too late given
the 2.5-sec average driver reaction time (Appendix A). Moreover,
such crash cannot be prevented from the truck driver side since the
truck driver also does not have enough reaction time to yield.
Stealthiness. To understand the attack stealthiness, we show
the camera frames from the driver’s view 2.5 sec before the attack
succeeds on the right of Fig. 12. Similar to the results in §5.1, in the
highway scenario the patch is almost invisible and in the local road
scenario it looks to have similar or smaller white dirty patterns
compared to the normal real-world ones such as those in Fig. 9.
However, if the human driver is not alerted and takes over at this
point, she misses the last chance to prevent the crash.
7 LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSE DISCUSSION
7.1 Limitations of Our Study
Attack deployability. Our current design mainly focuses on at-
tack effectiveness and robustness in the physical world but does
not systematically optimize its deployability. For example, in §5
and §6, the malicious road patch sizes we currently use are at least
3.6-meter wide and 24-meter long. This does not render our attack
undeployable though, since the attacker can (1) use adhesive road
patches (Fig. 2) to make the deployment quicker, (2) pretend to be
road works to make the deployment to appear more legitimate, (3)
pick a deployment time when the target road is the most vacant,
e.g., in late night, and (4) break the entire patch into smaller pieces
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and deploy them one at a time to avoid drawing too much atten-
tion. Nevertheless, smaller patch sizes can still generally make the
deployment process easier and thus increase the practicality of our
attack. One idea we plan to explore is to constrain the perturbations
to only a few most effective small regions inside the current patch
area in the optimization, so that the attacker only need to deploy
patches to these small regions, instead of the entire patch area.
Practicality evaluation. In this work, we did not perform eval-
uation with real vehicles on real roads due to legal, safety, and
ethical concerns as discussed in §5.4. This thus makes it still un-
clear how effective our attack can actually perform in the real world.
Nevertheless, we tried our best to reach the limit of any academic
research works by evaluating our attack against various possible
real-world factors such as motion model inaccuracies, lighting con-
ditions, printer color accuracy, and camera sensing capability (§5.2
and §5.4). To more concretely understand its end-to-end safety im-
plications without incurring safety concerns, we also evaluate our
attack on concrete real-world attack scenarios using a production-
grade simulator (§6). Note that similar to us, companies such as
Waymos and Uber also heavily rely on trace-based and simulation-
based evaluations when developing and testing their driving au-
tomation systems for safety and budget considerations [72–74].
Generality evaluation. Although we have shown high attack
generality against LD models with different designs (§5.3), all our
evaluations are performed on only one production ALC system
in OpenPilot. Thus, it is still unclear whether other popular ALC
systems, e.g., Tesla Autopilot and GM Cruise, are vulnerable to our
attack. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the OpenPilot
ALC system is the only production one that is open sourced, and
it is unlikely for these other companies to do so in the near future.
Nevertheless, since the OpenPilot ALC system is representative
at both design and implementation levels (§5), we believe that as
the first study our current discovery and evaluation results can
already most generally benefit the understanding of the security of
state-of-the-art ALC systems today. Also, since DNN models are
generally vulnerable to adversarial attacks [4–7, 11, 31–36, 52], if
these other ALC systems also adopt the state-of-the-art DNN-based
design, at least at design level they are also vulnerable to our attack.
7.2 Defense Discussion
Machine learningmodel level defenses. In the recent arms race
between adversarial machine learning attacks and defenses, numer-
ous defense/mitigation techniques have been proposed, e.g., model
ensembling [75], randomization [76, 77], image transformation [78–
81], and adversarial training [53]. However, so far none of them
can guarantee general high effectiveness in practice, and the newly-
proposed ones are constantly being defeated over time [66, 82].
Moreover, these prior works concentrate on image classification
and object detection models, which thus cannot directly be applied
to LDmodels. Thus, in the defense direction, we plan to first explore
domain-specific adaptions of existing defense strategies in other
application domains to LD models, and then leverage the insights
to design effective solutions specific to our problem setting.
Sensor/data fusion based defenses. Besides securing the LD
models, another defense direction is to fuse camera-based lane de-
tection with other independent sensor/data sources such as LiDAR
and High Definition (HD) map [83]. For example, although LiDAR is
generally designed for measuring distances instead of recognizing
colors, it can actually capture the tiny light reflection differences
between road surface with and without lane line markings, and
thus is possible to perform lane detection [84]. However, due to its
high cost, to the best of our knowledge, none of the production ALC
systems today are equipped with LiDAR [3, 12, 27]. Moreover, Elon
Musk, the co-founder of Tesla, claims that LiDARs are “expensive
sensors that are unnecessary (for autonomous vehicles)” [85].
Another possible fusion source is lane information from an HD
map, which is a technology used in production-level high-autonomy
(e.g., Level-4) autonomous driving systems [48, 86]. However, to
obtain accurate lane information from an HD map, an accurate
positioning of the vehicle in such a map is needed in the first
place, and the state-of-the-art solution of such positioning is still
based on LiDAR [87–93]. While LiDAR is indeed not very cost-
effective for normal operations, our results show that camera-based
lane detection alone is actually not secure enough. Thus, we hope
that the findings and insights in this paper can bring attention and
motivate the consideration of incorporating LiDAR or other sensors
useful for lane detection into future ALC systems.
8 RELATEDWORK
Autonomous Driving (AD) system security. Recently, resear-
chers have started to study the security of AD systems due to their
increasing popularity. Since AD systems heavily rely on sensors,
prior works have studied sensor attacks in AD context such as
spoofing/jamming attacks on camera [94–96], LiDAR [94, 97, 98],
radar [95], ultrasonic [95], and IMU [99, 100]. In comparison, these
works mainly focus on vulnerabilities at the sensor level, while we
focus on those at the higher autonomy software level, i.e., the “brain”
of AD systems. At the autonomy software level, prior works have
studied the security of camera/LiDAR-based object detection [5–
7, 98, 101] and tracking [102], and end-to-end AD models [37–
40]. Regarding our focus, production-level ALC systems, the only
prior effort is from Tencent [9]. However, unlike us, as discussed
in §1 it neither attacks the designed operational domain for ALC
systems (i.e., roads with lane lines), nor generates perturbations
systematically by addressing any of the 3 design challenges in §3.3.
Digital-space adversarial attacks. Since Szegedy et al. [11]
first discovered the existence of adversarial examples, a huge num-
ber of adversarial attack methods have been proposed to generate
adversarial examples in the digital image space [31, 52, 53, 103, 104].
In comparison, we focus on adversarial attacks realizable in the
physical world against production DNN-based systems, which re-
quires to address various new design challenges (§3.3, §4).
Physical-world adversarial attacks.Multiple priorworks have
explored image-space adversarial attacks in the physical world [5–
7, 32–36, 105]. In particular, various techniques have been designed
to improve the physical-world robustness , e.g., non-printability
score [5, 6, 33, 36] and low-saturation colors [7] for printer color dis-
tortion, and EoT for camera angle and distance changes [5–7, 34, 35].
In comparison, prior efforts concentrate on image classification and
object detection, while we are the first to systematically design
physical-world adversarial attacks on ALC systems, which requires
to address various new and unique design challenges (§3.3).
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9 CONCLUSION
In this work, we are the first to systematically study the security
of DNN-based ALC systems in their designed operational domains
under physical-world adversarial attacks. We identify a novel attack
vector, dirty road patches, and perform optimization-based attack
generation with novel designs such as motion model based input
generation and lane-bending objective function. Attack evaluation
on a production ALC system using real-world driving traces shows
that our attack has over 92% success rates with success time sub-
stantially lower than the average driver reaction time, and is also
robust to motion model inaccuracies, different LD model designs,
and physical-world factors. We further evaluate on concrete real-
world attack scenarios using simulation, and find that our attack
can cause severe end-to-end safety consequences. We also discuss
defense directions. Considering the popularity of ALC systems and
the severe security/safety implications shown in this paper, we
hope that our findings and insights can bring community attention
and inspire the development of effective defenses in practice.
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APPENDIX
A REQUIRED DEVIATIONS AND SUCCESS
TIME
Required deviations. The required deviations for the highway
and local roads are calculated based on Toyota RAV4 width (includ-
ing mirrors) and standard lane widths in the U.S. [71] as shown
in Fig. 13. We use Toyota RAV4 since it is the reference vehicle
used by the OpenPilot team when collecting the comma2k19 data
set [64]. For the lane widths, we refer to the design guidelines [71]
published by the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal High-
way Administration. The required deviations to touch the lane line
are calculated using L−C2 = 0.735m (highway) and 0.285m (local),
where L is the lane width and C is the vehicle width.
Required success time. Since ALC systems assume a fully at-
tentive human driver who is prepared to take over at any mo-
ment [1, 10], the required deviation above needs to be achieved
fast enough so that the human driver cannot react in time to take
over and steer back. Thus, when we define the attack goal, we
require not only the required deviation above, but also an attack
success time that is smaller than the average driver reaction time to
road hazards. We select the average driver reaction time based on
different government-issued transportation policy guidelines [41–
44]. In particular, in the California Department of Motor Vehicles
Commercial Driver Handbook Section 2.6.1 [41], it describes (1) a
1.75 seconds average perception time, i.e., the time from the time
the driver’s eyes see a hazard until the driver’s brain recognizes it,
and (2) a 0.75 to 1 seconds average reaction time, i.e., the time from
the driver’s brain recognizing the hazard to physically take actions.
Thus, in total it’s 2.5 to 2.75 seconds from the driver’s eyes seeing
a hazard to physically take actions. The UK “Highway Code Book”
and “Code of Practice for Operational Use of Road Policing Enforce-
ment Technology” use 3 seconds for driver reaction time [42, 43].
National Safety Council also adopts a 3-second driver reaction time
to calculate the minimum spacing between vehicles [44]. Among
them, we select the smallest one, i.e., 2.5 seconds from the Cali-
fornia Department of Motor Vehicles [41], as the required success
time in this paper to avoid possible overestimation of the attack
effectiveness in our evaluation.
Note that the driver reaction time above is commonly referring
to the reaction time to apply the brake, instead of steering. In our
paper, we use such reaction time to apply the brake as the reaction
time to take over the steering wheel when the ALC systems is in
control of the steering wheel. This is because in traditional driving,
the driver is actively steering the vehicle but passively applying the
15
, , Takami Sato, Junjie Shen, Ningfei Wang, Yunhan Jack Jia, Xue Lin, and Qi Alfred Chen
Vehicle width: C = 2.13 m
Local road lane width: L = 2.7 m
Highway lane width: L = 3.6 m
Figure 13: Vehicle and lane widths used in this paper.
brake. However, when the ALC system is controlling the steering,
the human driver is passively steering the vehicle, i.e., her hands are
not actively controlling the steering wheel. Thus, the reaction time
to take over the steering wheel during passive steering is analogous
to that to apply the brake during passive braking.
In fact, the actual average driver reaction time when the ALC
system is taking control are likely to be much higher than the 2.5
seconds measured in tradition driving, due to the reliance of human
drivers on such convenient driving automation technology today.
A recent study performed a simulation-based user study on Tesla
Autopilot, and found that 40% drivers fail to react in time to avoid a
crash happening 6.2 seconds after the Autopilot fails to operate [106].
In the real world, it is found multiple times that Tesla drivers fall
asleep with Autopilot controlling the vehicle in high speed [107].
Thus, the required success time of 2.5 seconds used in this paper is a
relatively conservative estimation, and thus the attack effectiveness
reported in our evaluations is likely only a lower bound of the
actual effectiveness of our attack in the real world.
B DIFFERENTIABLE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE CURVE FITTING PROCESS
Since the direct LD model output is the detected left and right lane
line points (§2.1), a curve fitting step is further required to calculate
ρt (d ; {Xaj |j ≤ t}) in Eq. 8 from the lane line points. This step also
needs to be differentiable to allow the entire f (·) differentiable by
{Xaj |j ≤ t}. Thus, we further perform a differentiable construction
of the curve fitting process as follows. We use Pl , Pr ∈ R |Dt | to
represent the left and right lane line points respectively, where their
indexes represent x-axis (longitudinal coordinate) and their values
represent the y-axis (lateral coordinate). We first fit the lane line
points into polynomial curves in a least-square manner with ξl =
(VTV )−1VT Pl and ξr = (VTV )−1VT Pr , where ξl , ξr ∈ Rn+1 are
the coefficients of the n-degree polynomial functions of the left and
right lane lines respectively, and V ∈ R |Dt |×n+1 is a Vandermonde
matrix. Then we calculate the desired driving path coefficients ξd by
averaging those for the left and right lane lines: ξd = 12 (ξl + ξr ). As
all operations above are written in closed form, the desired driving
path polynomial ρt (d) = [1,d,d2, ...,dn ]ξd is differentiable by each
lane line point.
Table 5: Evaluation results for attack robustness under dif-
ferentmotionmodel inaccuracy levels. ∆ controls the errors
introduced to lateral and longitudinal moving directions in-
dependently following the uniform distributionU(−∆,∆).
Error Level
∆ (meter)
Highway Local
Succ. rate Succ. time (s) Succ. rate Succ. time (s)
0.012 97.5% 0.876 100% 0.926
0.024 97.5% 0.881 100% 0.767
0.048 97.5% 0.869 100% 0.814
0.096 95.0% 0.814 82.5% 0.797
C ROBUSTNESS TO MOTION MODEL
INACCURACIES
Experimental setup. According to previous studies, the errors
of the kinematic bicycle model used in our attack are around 0.08
meters on average with a standard deviation of around 0.02 meters
when the control frequency is 10 Hz (i.e., control applied every 100
ms) [59]. Since the control frequency in OpenPilot is 100 Hz, we
estimate the errors in one control step (applied every 10 ms) as
having 0.008 meters mean with 0.002 meters standard deviation.
Based on this, in this section we evaluate the attack effectiveness
with motion model errors randomly sampled from the uniform
distributionU (−∆,∆)with ∆ = 0.012, 0.024, 0.048 and 0.096, which
correspond to 2×, 4×, 8×, and 16× standard deviations respectively.
These errors are added to the longitudinal and lateral position
changes independently at each control step whenwe use the motion
model to obtain the driving trajectory of the victim at the attack
evaluation time. The evaluation dataset and metrics are the same
as those in §5.1. The experiments use the same malicious road
patches generated in §5.1 with λ = 10−3 and PAR=50%, the default
stealthiness level as discussed in §5.1.
Results. Table 5 shows the attack success rates and time under
each error level. As shown, evenwhen the error level is 0.048meters,
our attack can still achieve 100% and 97.5% success rates for local
road and highway scenarios respectively, and the average success
time is still all under 0.95 sec. Such error level corresponds to 8
times the error standard deviation, or 8-sigma, meaning that an
error higher than this only occurs once every 1015 times. Since our
attack on average takes less than 1 sec, or 100 control steps, such
high attack effectiveness (≥97.5% success rates) is almost always
(a probability of 1 − 10−13) robust to motion model errors that can
occur during the attack. The success rate only drops significantly,
but still over 80%, for local road scenarios when the error level is
as high as 0.096 meters. Note that such error level means that in
the worst case the motion model can have nearly 10 meters error
per second, which is almost one half of a typical local road speed
(e.g., 45 mph) and 35 times the required deviation for local road
scenarios. Thus, this error level has significant effect on the attack
effectiveness for local road scenarios. The attack effectiveness for
highway scenarios is also affected, but much less than that for
local road ones since the speed and required deviation for highway
scenarios are higher.
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D DNN DESIGN DIFFERENCES FOR LD
MODELS IN ATTACK GENERALITY
EVALUATION (§5.3)
In §5.3, we select LD models from OpenPilot v0.7.0 (used in previ-
ous sections), v0.6.6, and v0.5.9 to perform generality evaluation
considering their large DNN architecture differences with each
other. Among them, the v0.5.9 model has the largest DNN archi-
tecture differences to the other two. First, the v0.5.9 model has 1.6
million trainable parameters and 49 layers, which are substantially
smaller than the other models: 58% fewer weights and 58% fewer
layers than the v0.7.0 model, and as high as 63% fewer weights and
60% fewer layers than the v0.6.6 model. At the design level, after a
sequence of the CNN residual blocks [108], the v0.5.9 model uses
a naive RNN layer [109], while the other two models use a more
advanced RNN design called Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU). GRU is
proposed to deal with long text in the natural language processing
domain similar to LSTM [110] because the naive RNN is known to
focus too much on the current and recent few words [111]. Thus,
the v0.6.6 and v0.7.0 models with such more advanced RNN design
should be able to consider more historical states and thus produce
more stable results during driving.
Between v0.6.6 model and the v0.7.0 model, the former has 4.2
million weights and 124 layers, which are 11% more weights and
7% more layers than the latter and thus the largest among the
three. A key design-level difference between them is that the Batch
Normalization (BN) layer [112] is used in the v0.6.6 model but later
removed in the v0.7.0 model, potentially because BN layers can
harm RNN perform [113].
E LGSVL-OPENPILOT BRIDGING
Since the original LGSVL simulator does not support OpenPilot,
for the end-to-end safety consequence evaluation in §6 we have
to implement the bridging between them (i.e., passing actuation
decisions and sensor data to each other) on our own. Since Open-
Pilot is designed and optimized for a dedicated device (EON), in
this process we overcome some engineering challenges detailed
below. This is an engineering contribution of this paper, we will
open source our LGSVL-OpenPilot bridge code to benefit future
works in related research areas.
Sensing/actuation channel interfacing. Currently, LGSVL
supports a ROS [114] based bridging to AD systems for receiv-
ing vehicle actuation commands and publishing simulated sensor
data. However, since OpenPilot is built with a ZeroMQ [115] based
messaging framework and has no existing support for simulation,
we develop the interface to achieve a frame-by-frame simulation of
OpenPilot driving in LGSVL. Such interface has 2 directions:
• (1) Passing sensor data from LGSVL to OpenPilot. OpenPilot
is originally designed as a driving agent directly running on
EON (the official OpenPilot dashcam). To support simulation,
we modify OpenPilot such that it accepts camera frames
from LGSVL instead of the native camera device driver on
EON. After our modification, as soon as OpenPilot receives a
camera frame, the lane detection, lateral control, and vehicle
actuation logic in OpenPilot are triggered one by one as
described in §2.1.
(a) Highway: hit concrete barrier. (b) Local: crash into a truck.
Figure 14: Snapshots of the attack demo videos when the at-
tack goals are achieved in the simulation for (a) the highway
scenario, and (b) the local road scenario in the end-to-end
safety consequence evaluation in §6.
• (2) Passing actuation commands from OpenPilot to LGSVL.
LGSVL allows the driving agent to control the built-in vehicle
both laterally (i.e., steering) and longitudinally (i.e., gas and
brake). In our interface design, we use OpenPilot to control
the lateral movement of the vehicle and use a simple PID
controller to control the longitudinal movement to maintain
a stable cruising speed.
Control interruption mechanism modification. Due to the
overhead of the frame rendering and sending, the simulation speed
cannot satisfy the real time execution requirement of the control
loop, which operates at 100 Hz. Thus, without loss of functional cor-
rectness, we disable the timer interrupt in the original control loop
and directly invoke 5 control iterations per frame since OpenPilot’s
control loop is 5× faster than the camera frame rate (20 Hz). To
match the simulation speed with the control frequency, we apply
the steering angle decision of each control iteration to the LGSVL
vehicle for a simulation duration of 0.01 seconds.
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Figure 15: Large images of the driver’s view images in Fig. 7, which correspond to the driver’s view 2.5 sec (average driver reac-
tion time [41]) before the attack succeeds under different stealthiness levels in our real world trace based attack effectiveness
evaluation in §5.1. The inset figures are the zoomed-in views of the malicious road patches.
18
Security of Deep Learning based Automated Lane Centering under Physical-World Attack , ,
(a) Driver’s view 2.5 sec before the attack succeeds in the highway scenario.
(b) Driver’s view 2.5 sec before the attack succeeds in the local road scenario.
Figure 16: Large images of the driver’s view images in Fig. 12, which corresponds to the driver’s view 2.5 sec (average driver
reaction time) before the attack succeeds in the simulation for (a) the highway scenario, and (b) the local road scenario in the
end-to-end safety consequence evaluation in §6. The inset figures are the zoomed-in views of the malicious road patches.
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